India and Pakistan – demilitarisation talks

May 24, 2006 Wary of repeat of Kargil experience, New Delhi does not want to ‘risk’ disengagement from dominant heights on the Saltoro Ridge unless there is ‘clear acceptance of authentication’ by Islamabad.

With Islamabad refusing to agree on authentication of present troop positions on Siachen glacier, the talks between India and Pakistan on demilitarisation of the world’s highest battlefield failed to yield any breakthrough here today, but the two countries decided to continue with the ceasefire there.

Concluding the two-day Defence Secretary-level talks, the two countries, however, issued a joint statement in which they agreed to continue the negotiations to resolve the vexed 22-year-old issue in a peaceful manner.

The two sides also reaffirmed their commitment to continue the ceasefire in Siachen in place since November 2003.

Siachen and the Indian Khaki

by Nasim Zehra, (Tuesday May 16 2006)  “…to ensure that at least a beginning is made in the conflict’s resolution between the two countries ? which are in their third year of dialogue ? the Indian Prime Minister needs to take the army along.”
On May 23, Pakistan and India will enter a crucial round of negotiations on Siachen in Delhi. These talks are important because they represent an opportunity to actually resolve a long-standing dispute between the two nuclear neighbors and demonstrate to the critics of the dialogue progress that the process is achieving more than just normalization of relations.

Behind the scenes, the foreign secretaries have discreetly worked on the details of the deal. However, as Pakistani and Indian leadership attempt to forge a resolution of the Siachen dispute, the hurdles, especially in India, are evident. For an agreement to be reached, the onus on managing the army rests on the Indian Prime Minister.

A formidable hurdle is the Indian armed forces itself. In April, when public indications were made regarding the possibility for India and Pakistan to reach an agreement on Siachen, the Indian armed forces took a public position against complete withdrawal from Siachen. The Indian armed forces’ public opposition is exceptionally surprising for two reasons. First, because of the Indian armed forces’ commendable tradition to stay clear of politics and public diplomacy. Second, because the military’s constitutional mandate is to work under the civilian leadership.

It is interesting to track the posturing between the Indian armed forces and India’s civilian leadership about the possibility of a Pakistan-India Siachen agreement. The civilian leadership’s position became evident on April 19 when ‘The Asian Age’ first carried the story ‘PM to take Siachen plan to Pak’. The report claimed that “Dr Manmohan Singh is now almost certain to take with him back channel negotiated solutions to Siachen and possibly Sir Creek.” It also detailed the possible way out of dealing with the abiding hurdle ? the authentication dilemma.

Part of the debate between the civilian and military leadership in Delhi revolves around the necessity for Pakistan to authenticate the illegally occupied positions that its troops held in Siachen since 1984. Pakistan refuses to authenticate, arguing that its authentication of these illegally held positions could potentially be used to establish India’s legal jurisdiction of these positions. According to ‘The Asian Age’, a possible solution to this issue was that India’s current troop positions be annexed to the main text of an agreement. This ‘Asian Age’ story also reports strong reservations within the army on a possible Siachen agreement.

The former Indian Army Vice-Chief Vijay Oberoi maintained that without authentication, it means India is ‘climbing down’, which is unacceptable to the military. The Indian armed forces made their position known on April 20, in AFP’s lead story ‘Indian army against deal with Pakistan on Kashmir glacier’. According to AFP, the Indian Army Chief, J. J. Singh said at a Press conference “we should not call it demilitarization as it is a process, and the first step will be disengagement and the next will be demilitarization, but it is not immediately on the horizon as we see it.”

Furthermore, on May 10, the Indian Air Force’s Air Officer-in-Chief of the Western Command sent a strong, as if non-negotiable, message. He told the visiting Press corps in Leh that: “There is no question of shutting the Siachen airfield. Its importance is not only from the strategic point of view, but also as a lifeline to the civilians.” He added “If demilitarization takes place ? like everybody else I hope it does ? the role of the IAF will remain. A certain role will be played in maintaining the troops. Our role will certainly remain.”

Significantly, on May 11, in response to a question in Parliament, the Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee said: “There is no decision taken at present to pull out troops from the Siachen Glacier.” Clearly, the Indian government must feel the heat of the Indian military establishment. But that is not entirely new where it comes to Siachen. Two earlier agreements, in 1989 and in 1992, were almost through but scuttled in Delhi at the last minute. At the moment, the Indian armed forces are objecting on four grounds.

First, that the Indian leadership is planning to make the Indian army give up a strategic gain. There is some thinking within the army and among India’s strategic establishment that in vacating Siachen, India will be favouring Pakistan, and therefore, it would be ill-advised. The assumption, in most comments by India’s defence personnel, is that Pakistan will try and re-capture Siachen. Clearly, the track record of both sides of the LoC has been one of ‘hit and claim’ whenever possible; whether Kargil (first India occupied during the 1971 war, and then Pakistan in 1999) or Chor Batla.

The second argument is that Siachen should be linked to the Kashmir solution and that India must demand a quid pro quo on Kashmir. Quoting a retired diplomat, ‘The Asian Age’ reported: “If we give up on Siachen, which is what this now amounts to, then we should be able to dictate some terms on Kashmir.”

The third position that the Indian defense establishment takes is that vacating Siachen would not be a prudent move. In case of a Pakistani occupation of Siachen, it would not be easy for India to regain control of it. They argue that the topographical advantages that accrue to Pakistan will make access many times more difficult for India.

According to Indian army sources quoted in the Indian Press: “It would take India six days to get to a point, while it would take Pakistan only four days.”

Finally, the fourth position is that complete withdrawal of the army and the air force will not be possible. The Indian Air Force must retain its base in Siachen. In Siachen at present, there are approximately 7,000 Indian army troops and about 4,000 Pakistani troops stationed at the 20,700-ft height. There, the cold is more of a killer than battle. It costs the Indian treasury about $223,000 a day to keep troops in Siachen.

Clearly, to ensure that at least a beginning is made in the conflict’s resolution between the two countries ‘ which are in their third year of dialogue ‘ the Indian Prime Minister needs to take the army along. Some contours of a possible agreement have almost been worked out as the foreign secretaries of the two countries have discreetly worked on it behind the scenes. But, unless the Indian civilian leadership can take the Indian Army along, the much-awaited Siachen agreement may yet again have a false start. Just like in 1989 and 1992.

Siachen Pioneers to get more punch

Leh, May 14 After having put their name in record books, the Siachen Pioneers, the Air Force’s lifeline to troops deployed in inaccessible areas atop the world?s highest battlefield, is looking at further enhancing its reach and capabilities with the induction of new helicopters.Known as the 114 Helicopter Unit, the very survival of troops manning posts as high as 22,000 feet depend upon the Siachen Pioneers, as the unit is aptly called, and their Cheetah helicopters, as no other flying machine can land at that altitude. The unit is now awaiting induction of the Cheetal helicopter, a re-engined and more powerful version of the Cheetah.

The Cheetals carried out summer trails over Siachen last year followed by winter trials during the last few months.

Cheetals were flown over the glacier for about 50 hours during each trial session by seasoned pilots to evaluate each aspect of the flying machine.

The Cheetal has the same airframe as the Cheetah, but is powered by the engine used in the Dhruv advanced light helicopter. A more powerful engine means we would be to fly still higher and be able to carry more load.

The Siachen Pioneers set a world record when it carried out a casualty evacuation from an altitude of 25,000 feet. The unit is awaiting ratification of this feat from the Gunnies Book of Records.

The 114 Helicopter Unit was raised at the 10,600 feet high Leh airbase on April 1, 1964, the IAF’s only flying unit to be raised at that altitude. It has seen action in Indo-Pak wars, major operations and other mercy operations. It was the 114 HU that supported the High Altitude Warfare School?s first ??exploratory expedition??, led by Colonel N Kumar to the Siachen Glacier area in September 1978.

The first landing in Siachen (as part of Operation Meghdoot) was on August 24, 1982, by a Cheetah helicopter of the unit. The 114 HU now has the unique distinction of being the only flying unit to be operating continuously in an active war zone for twenty years since Operation Meghdoot was launched in 1984. Since then it has been flying to altitudes as high as 20,000 feet as a matter of routine, holding its motto Apatsu Mitram ? A Friend in Distress ? in good stead.

Till the 1999 Kargil conflict, women pilots also flew with the squadron, but were later withdrawn following a policy decision owing to operational and physiological factors. It was during the Kargil conflict that women pilots flying in hostile environment came into prominence after pictures of Flg Offr Gunjan Saxsena climbing into a Cheetah?s cockpit with an AK-47 rifle sling across her shoulders were published.

Siachen map delineation must: Malik

New Delhi, PTI: May 13, 2006
Saying that there is still “immense mistrust” between the two countries, Malik said India should only agree for delmilitarization of the Siachen Glacier after Pakistan agrees to delineation of the 101 km-long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map or marking the position through aerial or satellite photography.

Former Army Chief Gen V P Malik has cautioned the country’s decision makers to insist on delineation of positions on Saltoro ridge before agreeing on demilitarization of the world’s highest battlefield.”Most people in India and Pakistan believe that demilitarization of Siachen is feasible as it could be the first political achievement in dialogue to take the peace process forward,” he states in his just-released book ‘Kargil – from surprise to victory’.

Malik says that it should not mean going back to the pre-1984 days when, without any delineation on the maps, it was possible for either side to lay claim or encroach into each other’s territory.

Saying that there is still “immense mistrust” between the two countries, Malik said India should only agree for delmilitarization of the Siachen Glacier after Pakistan agrees to delineation of the 101 km-long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map or marking the position through aerial or satellite photography.

“It is essential to mark the ground position on the AGPL so that future verification is possible, if any party violates the agreement”, the General states.

The battle over Siachen

Greaterkashmir.com May 12, 2006 – It?s a huge drain on their economies, it takes lives of those who are deployed to guard it, it means a lot of tension around for India and for Pakistan as well. The question is why? Hafizullah Shiekh writes

Siachen has witnessed sporadic armed clashes between India and Pakistani forces since April,1 1984 when the Indian army carried out a clandestine operation code-named ?Meghdoot? and established permanent posts at the Siachen glacier, since then the Indian tricolor has flown over Siachen. An upset and agitated Pakistani force launched a fierce attack to dislodge the Indian troops. The two nuclear armed neighbors have confronted each other militarily for control over the ice wasteland and its approaches in the eastern Karakorn mountain range, adjacent to the borders of India, Pakistan and China. The longest running armed conflict between the regular armies in the present century, the Siachen conflict has resulted in thousands of casualties from both sides, primarily because of adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain. This is despite the fact that the leaderships in India and Pakistan acknowledge the human and economic costs of the Siachen dispute.
Perhaps it symbolizes distrust between India and Pakistan. Since Siachen is in Kashmir, it also symbolizes Indo-Pak battle over the valley. For India control of Siachen is of key strategic importance allowing the Indian army to dominate the heights and over look the Pakistan-China highway. Pakistan believing that Siachen should be part of its territory, is also keen to control the heights for the very same reason, besides of course linking it to the overall dispute over Kashmir. Whatever may be the reality, the bottom line is that the human and economic costs of sustaining more than two decade long bloody conflict over the possession of the geographically remote and climatically inhospitable glacier continues to bleed both Pakistan and India dry.
According to careful estimates by Pakistani defense experts, to maintain three battalions at the icy wasteland of the Siachen, Islamabad spends Rs 15 million a day, which makes rupees 450 million a month and rupees 5.4 billion a year. On the other hand the deployment of seven battalions at the glacier costs India rupees 5.0 million a day, rupees 1.5 billion a month and rupees 30 billion a year. On average the experts say, one Pakistani soldier is killed every third day, on the glacier, showing approximately 100 casualties every year on average. Similarly one Indian soldier is killed every other day on the glacier, at an average of 180 casualties. According to unofficial figures over 2,200 Pakistani soldiers lost their lives on the glacier between 1984 and 2004 as against 4,000 Indian casualties.
According to Indian army sources air maintenance for the Siachen operation alone costs Rs 2.5 crores a day, or 1000 crores a year. A cheetah helicopter sortie costs Rs 2000 an hour, it can only carry 25 Kg when flying to high altitude. The cost of a loaf of bread that would be less than a rupee in the Kashmir valley is estimated by the times of India to be worth Rs 10,000 by the time it reaches Indian soldiers on Siachen
Conditions at Siachen are harsh. At 5,472 meters above sea level, the Siachen glacier is located in the Karakom mountain region, which has some of the highest peaks in the world like K2. The northern mountains of the glacier mark the watershed between the central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Bereft of vegetation, the glacier happens to be one of the world?s most inhospitable regions where temperature hovers around Minus 40ocentigrade.
The surroundings are too chilly to be tolerated. Bare skin. In winters strong winds from central Asia can further bring down the temperature to minus 50o. The glacier receives 6-7 meters of annual total of 10 meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards at a speed of 300 kms/h can only be imagined by an outsider. Many soldiers collapse of exhaustion after walking only a few yards. They have to take risks- e g falling off cliffs into a ravine-even to do something as routine as defecate. Siachen is proof not of any one?s bravery, but of expandability and low value of Indian and Pakistani lives.
The Indian army controls Siachen heights holding on to the tactical advantage of high ground, but the Pakistani army is slightly better of since it occupies smaller portion of the glacier and its road-head is only 20 kms away from the farthest post. Indian troops on the other hand are stationed about 80 km away from the road-head and have to be maintained entirely by Air, which is not only cost prohibitive but also risky because of the adverse weather conditions most of the times. Interestingly the Pakistani soldiers can not go up to the glacier and the Indian forces can not come down.
Two countries have talked in the past, the eighth round of talks was held after a gap of 7 years in Delhi in September 2004 in which both the countries agreed to discuss modalities for disengagement and redeployment of troops. They also agree to continue talks and find a solution to most serious issue that is Siachen.
Under the changed circumstances in south Asia there is every reason why Pakistan and India should pursue the matter in earnest. The peace process has received full baking from their people, and it is highly unlikely that hawkish opposition to an agreement for demilitarization will get popular support. The issue now poses a challenge to the two governments. If they pursue the matter in real earnest, there is no reason why they can not finally agree on a demilitarized Siachen.
It would not be prudent to expect too much too soon, but it is time for both the countries to seriously rethink that what they have gained by bleeding themselves-to control Siachen and both the countries should get of the old grooves and begin to look at the issue in the larger political and human context rather than simply in the narrow military sense. Let there be a cohesive plan of action followed by a positive political will by both the countries to at least agree on withdrawal to less harsh and more hospitable positions and to pledge that no patrols will be carried out by either side.

(Hafizullah Shiekh is a Research scholar Political Science Department, University of Kashmir)

Demilitarisation of Siachen – AOC-in-C for sector-by-sector approach

Vijay Mohan Tribune News Service Thoise, May 11, 2006 Suggesting a sector-by-sector demilitarization of Siachen Glacier, the world?s highest battlefield, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, Air Marshal S.K. Singh, said that first both sides must arrive at a broad policy agreement on the issue. ??Once a decision is made in principle, things can be worked out further on a sector-by-sector basis,?? he said while addressing media persons at Thoise Airfield, the launching pad for air operations in Siachen. The Siachen glacier consists of five sub-sectors. Since the Indian Army moved to occupy the frozen heights in 1984, India and Pakistan had been involved in regular fire fights till November 2003, when a mutually agreed upon ceasefire was implemented along the Line of Control. ??The two-and-a-half-year-long ceasefire is a major respite. This, coupled with other confidence building measures is leading us towards a solution to the issue of demilitarisation of the area,?? Air Marshal Singh said. ??If that solution completes the picture then we can impose it or put it in place piece by piece,?? he added. ??If demilitarisation does take place, the role of the Air Force in the region would be reduced, but by no means would it be over,?? he said. ??Some troops would always be positioned in the area to man certain posts and it would be for the IAF to maintain them,?? he added. The WAC chief also ruled out relying totally on technology for surveillance in the post-demilitarisation era. ??Unmanned aerial vehicles and remote surveillance equipment can only be used partially in this sector because it is difficult to control them under extreme weather and climatic conditions,?? Air Marshal Singh said. ??Technology can never completely replace human assets,?? he added On the issue of the 1999 Kargil conflict, he denied there was any delay on the part of the IAF to launch air operations against the Pakistani intruders. On the question of Gen V P Malik?s recently released book on the conflict, Air Marshal Singh said that it does not match official records. ??The book contains his individual viewpoints and there are several dichotomies in it,?? he remarked. General Malik was the Chief of the Army during the conflict, while Air Marshal Sing was Air-I WAC, in charge of the IAF operations. Air Marshal Singh also stressed upon the need for setting up an Aerospace Command. ??We are fast moving towards space and require an aerospace command, which should include agencies like ISRO and HAL,?? he said. Besides air maintenance, the IAF is also assisting the Army in counter insurgency operations. ??At any given time, we have two fully armed Mi-17s, equipped with guns, rockets, night vision goggles and search and rescue equipment on stand-by at Doda,?? the Air Marshal said. The Leh and Thoise airfields have also been made fully fighter aircraft capable and aircraft come there regularly for exercises.